INTRODUCTION
An influential tradition of thought going back to Immanuel Kant holds that democracies are unlikely to fight each other. In his famous essay on the "Perpetual Peace," Kant (1983 Kant ( [1795 wrote that constitutional republics were a necessary condition for enduring peace in the world.
The philosopher reasoned that a majority of the people would usually not vote to go to war because it is them and their children who suffer from the costs and casualties. Therefore, if all nations were republics it would end war.
Indeed, since they emerged in the early 19 th century, liberal democracies have rarely fought wars against each other (Doyle 1986; Maoz & Russett 1993; Brown, Lynn-Jones & Miller 1996) . Hence, the 'dyadic' peace thesis-the proposition that democracies rarely fight each other-is one of the best established regularities in political science (Levy 1989; Russett & Oneal 2001) . More recently, evidence is accruing that even a 'monadic' peace is rising: thesis' suggests a link between these two trends: because democracies are less likely to wage wars, their diffusion explains growing inter-state peace. This assumption is consistent with the view that the reasons why democracies go less frequently to war reside in inner characteristics of democracy itself: since the economic, psychological and human costs of wars are disproportionately imposed on the masses, a system that allows the masses to vote their preferences into power (which is what democracy is about) is less likely to wage wars (Maoz 1997; Bueno de Mesquita & Morrow 1999; Palmer, London & Regan 2004) . Also, the publics that have been democratic in the past perceive each other as belonging to a 'family of nations'
with shared values, which is well reflected in the strong international alliances and dense trade relations that 'Western' democracies forge among each other (Henderson 1998; Owen 1994) .
Others, going back to Elias (1987) , argue that the 'civilizing process' writ large embodies a tendency to pacify inter-human relations: the enforcement of law and order and an effective monopoly of violence operate to this end (Nazaretyan 2009). With accelerating globalization and the growth of 'international regimes,' the pacifying tendencies spill over from the intra-state level to the international level, promoting inter-state peace (Hasenclever, Mayer & Rittberger 1997) . As interdependencies increase, the costs of war begin to outweigh its benefits (Weede 1996; Gartzke & Hewitt 2010; Mousseau 2010 ). An understanding of interdependencies emerges accordingly and feeds the proliferation of norms, agencies and instruments to prevent war (Gat 2012 ).
Another argument attributes the pacification trend to a different tendency of modernity: a shift in the source of power from coercion to creativity. With the rise of knowledge economies in the post-industrial age, the key engine of progress is technology, innovation, creativity, and other fluid assets of an intellectual nature rather than 'fixed assets' of a physical nature, such as arable land and natural resources (Bell 1973; Toffler 1990; Drucker 1993; Florida 2002) . Under this condition, waging war becomes irrational: intellectual assets cannot be confiscated and conquered; they need to be cultivated through peaceful exchange (Nye 2004; Gat 2006 ).
This article does not question these ideas. Instead, it suggests a new factor that operates in concert with the previously mentioned tendencies. Following Welzel's (2013) Evolutionary Emancipation Theory (EET), we argue that massively improving existential conditions, from longer life expectancies to better education and information to improved technological equipment, are transforming the lives of a growing proportion of people in the world from a source of threats to suffer into a source of opportunities to thrive. Where this happens, societies climb the 'utility ladder of freedoms': practicing and tolerating universal freedoms becomes increasingly instrumental to taking advantage of what a more promising life offers. Using data from more than ninety societies around the globe, we demonstrate that the ascending utility of freedoms is visible in rising emancipative values, which emphasize universal freedoms. The emancipatory trend is most significant where the fixation of traditional survival norms on childbearing, fertility, marriage and other features of the patriarchal family model shows its strongest resistance against emancipation: reproductive autonomy, including the freedom to abort an unconsented pregnancy, to divorce an unloved partner and to follow a homosexual orientation. In tandem with the ascending utility of freedoms, the utility of force descends, which erodes a central pillar of traditional survival norms: people's willingness to fight wars. This is a genuinely new insight with an important implication: the emancipatory transformation of contemporary cultures around the globe is a pacifistic force that fosters an increasingly solid mass basis for inter-state peace. To establish this insight, the article proceeds in five sections. Section one is theoretical-conceptual: it discusses Evolutionary Emancipation Theory in relation to recent scholarship on inter-state peace. Section two derives three empirical hypotheses from this discussion. Section three describes the evidence base, measurements and methods to test these hypotheses. Section four presents the findings. The fifth and final section discusses the key implications of our insights.
THEORY
Recently, various scholars have stressed a long-term decline in the use of violence. Pinker (2011) demonstrates that European societies have seen a continuous and massive decline in their homicide rates since late medieval times. In the 17th and 18th centuries, they began to abolish slavery, witch burning, dueling, judicial torture, corporal punishment, and other cruelties. Pinker (2011) suggests a number of reasons for the decline of violence, including the growth of states' capacities to enforce law, order and a monopoly on the means of coercion; the spread of market transactions that are undertaken peacefully and for mutual benefit; the spread of literacy, mobility and mass media that allow people to empathize with distant and different others; an intensifying application of knowledge and rationality to human affairs and a related increase in fluid intelligence known as the 'Flynn effect'; and the feminization of norms, which undermines the glorification of violence. As a result of these changes, societies climb up the 'escalator of reason' and 'enlightenment values' begin to dominate people's worldviews. In fundamental ways, this interpretation reinvigorates Elias's (1987) characterization of the 'civilization process' as an inherently 'feminizing' and 'pacifying' development.
In an impressive volume, Gat (2006) shows that war, raid and genocide have been the natural state of affairs throughout most of history. The evidence demolishes the romantic view that original societies were peaceful communities that avoided violence. And the evidence provided by Gat (2006) and Pinker (2011) suggests that existential threat is what turns humans into a violent species-confirming numerous findings gathered in decades of research on 'group threat theory.' As this research shows consistently, group identities always play a role in social behavior but turn more easily into inter-group hostilities under existential threats (Coser 1956; Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; Olzak 1992; Bobo 1999; Wilson 2005; Coenders, Lubbers & Scheepers 2008) .
Recent research in other disciplines--including anthropology and biology--also suggests that threatening conditions make people inclined to coercion, force and violence and intolerant of universal freedoms. Gelfand et al. (2011) distinguish between 'tight' and 'loose' cultures: while tight cultures erect taboos at the expense of universal freedoms, loose cultures provide entitlements to guarantee universal freedoms. The authors show that tightness-vs.-looseness is shaped by existential threats, with less-threatened societies showing greater tolerance of freedoms. Similarly, as well as Thornhill (2008, 2010) show that historically low vulnerability to disease is linked with high inter-group exchange, tolerance of freedoms and the emergence of democracy, while high vulnerability is linked with in-group closure, intolerance of freedoms and the persistence of authoritarianism. Together, these studies suggest that fading existential threats and increasingly permissive living conditions breed tolerance of freedoms and diminish inter-group hostilities. Where these improvements in existential conditions occur, most people's lives change from a source of threats to suffer into a source of opportunities to thrive. Welzel (2013) formulates the implications of this historic game change in his Evolutionary Emancipation Theory (EET). According to EET, multiplying life opportunities elevate societies on the 'utility ladder of freedoms': practicing and tolerating universal freedoms becomes increasingly instrumental to taking advantage of the options that a more promising life offers. In recognizing this utility shift, people embrace emancipative values, which emphasize universal freedoms.
Thus, people's subjective valuation of freedoms grows in adjustment to these freedoms' growing objective utility. This utility-value link has evolved to fit subjective human aspirations to objective life needs, which is vital to keep our existence in touch with reality.
As Welzel (2014) We analyze the data in three steps from three different angles, in the order of our hypotheses. In the first step, we apply a cross-sectional country-level perspective: we examine the fraction of people willing to fight in war per society, using the latest available survey from each society. We explain these fractions in multivariate regressions, testing the supposed impact Our key dependent variable is willingness to fight in war, which the WVS asks in the following way (variable V75 in the round five version of the master questionnaire):
"Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?"
The response options are "yes" and "no. Yet another indication of secure and permissive societal conditions is encompassing peace. We take the inverse of the 'global peace index' from the Vision of Humanity (2008), which uses a list of more than twenty indicators to indicate the incidence of both internal and external violence and conflict in a society.
We will see that two groups of countries stick clearly out from the general pattern, though in opposite ways. The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden) show much higher levels of willingness to fight than our independent variables suggest. By contrast, the losers of the World War II (East and West Germany, Italy, Japan) show much lower willingness to fight than our independent variables suggest. These deviations from the general pattern reflect historic experiences that are so specific to particular country groups that they cannot be tapped by a general variable. To capture these group-specific experiences, we use dummy variables for these two sets of countries.
The independent variable of main interest is emancipative values. Welzel (2013) [ Figure 1 about here]
Before we examine how emancipative values relate to people's willingness to fight in war, let us look at the variation in this willingness across countries. As Figure 2 illustrates, this variation is big, ranging from more than 90 percent of the population willing to fight in war in Rwanda, Viet Nam, Bangladesh and Qatar, to less than 30 percent in Italy, Japan and Germany.
[ Figure 2 about here] Figure 3 shows the cross-country relationship between emancipative values in the domain of reproductive freedoms and willingness to fight in war. Figure 3A (the upper panel) shows the relationship without controls; Figure 3B shows the relationship when we control for whether a society is a Nordic country and whether it is one of the defeated powers in World War II (two mutually exclusive categories).
[Figure 3 about here]
As Figure 3A demonstrates, the overall correlation between emancipative values and willingness to fight is reasonably strong and points in the predicted direction: it is a clearly negative relationship. dummy variables to control for these two groups' exceptionalism, the impact of emancipative values on willingness to fight surfaces stronger. As Figure 3B demonstrates, when we take into account whether a society was one of the Axis Powers in WWII or is a Nordic society, emancipative values explain fully fifty-three percent of the cross-national variance in willingness to fight.
[ Table 2 about here]
The multivariate regressions in Table 2 The first regression model introduces national pride, technological advancement and enduring democracy as predictors of the willingness to fight. Only national pride shows a significant effect, and it operates in the expected direction: in societies with more widespread national pride, willingness to fight is more widespread too. But, as we already know, the exceptionalism of the Nordic countries and the former Axis Powers obscures the pacifying effect of permissive existential conditions. Accordingly, as model 2 shows, when these two country dummies are included in the regression, the pacifying effects of technological advancement and enduring democracy become significant. Although they contain groups of only four countries and five countries respectively, the two dummies are remarkably powerful predictors of the willingness to fight. Including them increases the explained variance from twenty-two to fortyseven percent. Moreover, as model 3 demonstrates, the pacifying effect of permissive existential conditions is fully absorbed by emancipative values when we include them in the modelconfirming the expectation that permissive conditions operate mostly through their tendency to produce an emancipatory culture. Other permissive conditions include peace and cooperation.
When we introduce them instead of technological advancement and enduring democracy (model 4), neither cooperation nor peace turns out to have a highly significant and strong effect on willingness to fight in war. Nor does either of them diminish the effect of emancipative values.
In fact, emancipative values now turn out to show a stronger effect than before. Thus, the most efficient model with the largest explanatory power relative to the number of included variables is model 5. With only the two country groups and emancipative values, it explains sixty-six percent of the cross-national variance in willingness to fight across the seventy-seven societies for which data are available. As the partial regression plot in Figure 3B has shown, fifty-three percent of the variance is accounted for by emancipative values alone.
Longitudinal Evidence
The evidence so far indicates that more widespread emancipative values are linked with less widespread willingness to fight in war. This holds true under control of plausible alternative causes of willingness to fight. However, this evidence is purely cross-sectional. For this reason, it cannot be interpreted as causal. To come closer to a causal interpretation, we must establish that a dynamic relationship between emancipative values and willingness to fight exists and that this dynamic association withstands controls of alternative dynamics.
During the past thirty years, the world as a whole has become substantially more prosperous, educated, connected and people's lives have become longer. At the same time, as
Welzel (2014) 
[Figure 4 about here]
To enhance comparability with Welzel's evidence for rising emancipative values, Figure   4 includes all forty-eight societies for which data covering a time span of at least ten years is available. Fortunately, this smaller sample does not embody a selection bias. It still includes the societies with the biggest populations and largest economies from each world region. And there 21 is no selection on the dependent or independent variables: the full spectrum of variation among the key variables is covered.
Among this sample, the public's willingness to fight decreased in 43 societies, showed no change in 2 societies, and increased in only 3 societies. Thus, fourteen times as many publics show a decreasing willingness to fight, as show a growing willingness. The average change is a 12-point decline in the percentage saying they would be willing to fight for their country.
[ Figure 4 about here]
Can we explain the decrease in people's willingness to fight in war by the concurrent rise of emancipative values? To answer this question, the analyses in Table 3 regress willingness to fight in war at the time of the latest survey for each society (T 2 ) on (a) the willingness at the time of the earliest survey (T 1 ) and (b) on change from T 1 to T 2 in the supposed predictor variables.
[ Table 3 about here]
Obviously, this is a lagged-dependent variable model, which is one reason why this model is dynamic: under control of the lagged dependent variable, other predictors in the model explain willingness to fight at the later point in time insofar as it remains unexplained by willingness to fight at the earlier point in time. This is equivalent to explaining change in willingness to fight. The other reason why the model is dynamic is that the presumed predictors themselves measure change. Hence, the regressions show to what extent change from T 1 to T 2 in a given predictor helps to shift willingness to fight at T 2 below its level at T 1 .
9
Including the lagged dependent variable among the predictors has two desirable properties. For one, we reduce the problem of endogeneity: should other predictors in the model be endogenous to willingness to fight in the sense that their change is triggered by lagged willingness to fight, this is taken care of. Next, we reduce omitted variable bias: lagged willingness to fight in war embodies virtually every prior influence on willingness to fight, including influences not specifically addressed by an additional variable.
Note that time in this analysis is represented by different variables, not repeated country entries. Thus, there is no serial correlation among adjacent observations, so we need neither a Durbin-Watson test, nor do we need to run regressions with panelcorrected standard errors.
Under these premises, the two models in Table 3 show that willingness to fight has a strong component of temporal self-perpetuation. This is evident from the large coefficients for the lagged dependent variable. In the first model, for instance, we see that a level of willingness to fight one unit above the constant term at time T 1 means a half a unit level above the constant term at time T 2 . Other than that, the models in Table 4 are designed in a parsimonious way by including not more than four variables at a time. The reason is that the sample of forty-some societies quickly shrinks to thirty and even below when several variables are paired. Because they are a powerful constant factor, the dummies for the two country groups are introduced in each model, providing a reference base against which the impact of change in the shifting variables is estimated. But as said, we introduce change in the four shifting variables of interest each at a time. What are the results?
Surprisingly from the viewpoint of the democratic peace thesis, change in democracy from time T 1 to time T 2 (which turns out to be mostly increases for the covered societies and observation period) does not significantly shift willingness to fight at time T 2 below its level at time T 1 . Neither does further technological advancement have such an effect. An increase in international cooperation, for tis part, has only a slightly significant effect to this end. The strongest effect to this end, and the only one that is highly significant, is due to an increase in emancipative values: a one unit increase in emancipative values from time T 1 to time T 2 shifts willingness to fight in war at time T 2 a little more than half a unit below its level at time T 1 . This is not an artifact of the sample now shrinking to twenty-four societies: if we reran the regressions with the other three shift variables over this smaller sample, they remain insignificant.
[Figure 5 about here]
Of course, with data available for only twenty-four societies, these results have to be taken with a strong note of caution. Yet, the fact that the available longitudinal evidence unequivocally supports our hypothesis is noteworthy. Figure 5 visualizes the partial effect of rising emancipative values on shrinking willingness to fight in war, as shown in Model 4 of Table 3 . The graph also shows the composition of the sample of the twenty-four societies. It is obvious that this is still a diverse global sample, containing some of the most typical societies from each world region, such as China, India, Japan, Russia, Mexico, the US, Sweden, Poland, Italy, South Africa or Turkey. There is no apparent selection bias in this sample by either regional origin or the dependent and independent variables. [ Table 4 about here] Table 4 shows the results of the multi-level analysis using a linear probability model to explain the individuals' willingness to fight in war. 10 Let's focus on the most interesting findings.
Multi-level Evidence
We have already seen in the country-level regressions in Table 1 The dependent variable is a dummy, indicating whether an individual is willing to fight in war (coded 1) or unwilling to do so (coded 0). For decades, the standard choice of functional form for such models has been logistic probability models. Since Mood's (2010) study, this has changed because she shows that odds ratios and log odds are incomparable across groups and samples-which is a blowing criticism in the context of a multi-level framework with many different national samples. At the same time, Mood's study proves that the standard criticisms held against linear probability models (i.e., linear regressions with binary dependent variables) are unjustified in most cases of application. national pride on willingness to fight is further enhanced. This is logical: an emancipatory culture reduces the mean level of willingness to fight in war, making more people unwilling to fight. Under this condition, national pride is needed more to sustain a person's willingness to fight.
The Nordic country dummy interacts with national pride in the opposite direction, which also is logical: living in a Nordic country means living in an environment with a widespread willingness to fight. Under this condition, national pride is needed less to sustain a person's willingness to fight. Consequently, we find a negative interaction between the Nordic country dummy and an individual's level of national pride.
CONCLUSION
Cross-sectional, longitudinal and multi-level evidence from around the world provides strong support of the Evolutionary Emancipation Theory (EET): improving existential conditions turn the lives of most people in a society from a source of threats to suffer into a source of opportunities to thrive, thus elevating societies on the 'utility ladder of freedoms.' In recognition of this utility shift, people adopt emancipative values that emphasize universal freedoms. In tandem with freedoms' ascending utility, the utility of coercion, force and violence descends.
Consequently, rising emancipative values-especially in the domain of reproductive autonomy--erode primordial survival norms in one of their strongest bastion's: willingness to fight other people in war. Increasingly, the reason why democracy is linked with peace is that it flourishes in a culture of emancipation. Thus, the emancipatory transformation of contemporary cultures might turn out to operate as a pacifist force that underpins inter-state peace with an increasingly solid mass basis.
In the longitudinal dimension, the evidence on which our findings rest is still limited.
This raises a note of caution and strongly underlines the need to prolong the time series of our observations. To do this, researchers must continue monitoring questions on people's emancipative values and their willingness to fight in war. Of particular interest in this context 
Note:
The left-hand diagram shows the simple bivariate relationship between the fractions of national publics willing to fight in war and the same publics' mean emphasis on emancipative values. The right-hand diagram shows the same relationship controlled for two dummy variables, each representing a country group: the Nordic countries and the former axis powers.
Before Controls After Controls
Emancipative Values (uncontrolled), latest survey Emancipative Values (controlled), latest survey 
Change in Emancipative Values (residuals)
Note: Relationship is shown under inclusion of the controls of Model 4 in Table 2 . 
